Preventive measures aimed at minimizing the risk of African swine fever virus spread in pig farming systems by unknown
Bellini et al. Acta Vet Scand  (2016) 58:82 
DOI 10.1186/s13028-016-0264-x
REVIEW
Preventive measures aimed 
at minimizing the risk of African swine fever 
virus spread in pig farming systems
Silvia Bellini1* , Domenico Rutili2 and Vittorio Guberti3
Abstract 
African swine fever (ASF) is one of the most severe diseases of pigs; it has a drastic impact on the pig industry, causing 
serious socio-economic consequences to pig farmers and pork producers. In Europe, there are currently two main 
clusters of infection; one in Sardinia caused by strains of African swine fever virus (ASFV) belonging to genotype I and 
another in Eastern Europe caused by strains of ASFV belonging to genotype II. The latter is inducing an acute form of 
ASF and it represents a serious threat to the pig sector. ASF is a disease for which there is no effective vaccine; there-
fore, prevention has a pivotal role in the control strategy of the disease. This review describes the main preventive 
measures to adopt to mitigate the risk of ASF spread in pig farming systems.
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Background
African swine fever (ASF) is a contagious and fatal dis-
ease of pigs caused by African swine fever virus (ASFV) 
currently classified as the only member of the Asfarviri‑
dae family. ASF is one of the most serious diseases of 
pigs; it can severely affect and disrupt regional and inter-
national trade with animals and animal products with 
a serious socio-economic impact on pig farming. The 
disease is mainly transmitted by direct contact between 
infected and susceptible pigs or through the ingestion of 
ASFV contaminated pork products [1, 2]. Wild boar (Sus 
scrofa) and feral pigs in general are also susceptible to 
ASFV and they show similar clinical signs and mortality 
rates as domestic pigs [3]. In certain areas, soft ticks of 
Ornithodoros genus can be involved in the epidemiology 
of the disease.
African swine fever is endemic in sub-Saharan Africa 
and on the Italian island of Sardinia. In 2007, the dis-
ease was reported in Georgia, most probably originating 
from Southeast Africa. From Georgia, the virus spread 
to Armenia and to Azerbaijan, meanwhile it crossed the 
Caucasus Mountains spreading into several states of the 
Russian Federation where, in certain areas, the disease 
became endemic representing a constant threat for the 
neighbouring countries [3]. In 2013, from the Russian 
Federation, the virus reached Belarus and Ukraine and 
later, in 2014, it was introduced into Lithuania, Poland, 
Latvia and Estonia affecting both domestic pigs and wild 
boar. Based on the characteristics of the virus and on the 
epidemiological findings, the introduction into the Bal-
tic countries and into Poland was most probably from 
Belarus [4]. The ASFV strain that is currently circulat-
ing in the Eastern European countries and Baltic States 
is a highly virulent and highly lethal strain, belonging to 
genotype II which has 100% sequence homology with the 
ASFV identified in Belarus in June 2013 [5].
More than 1 year after its introduction into Poland and 
into the Baltic countries, ASF is still spreading in wild 
boar in the eastern member states of the European Union 
(EU) with few spill overs into the domestic pig popula-
tion, while in Sardinia, Ukraine and in the Russian Fed-
eration the virus continues to spread in both wild boar 
and domestic pigs. The current epidemiological situation 
in the Eastern part of Europe represents a constant threat 
to the EU livestock sector, particularly if the infection 
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pressure remains high at the eastern borders of the EU. 
The presence of ASF in Sardinia seems to pose a limited 
risk to the pig sector of the ASFV free territories of the 
EU. Indeed, in 38 years ASFV spread from the island of 
Sardinia only on one isolated occasion [6]. No vaccine or 
drugs are available to prevent ASFV infection. Therefore, 
it is particularly important to prevent the introduction of 
the disease in free areas and to reduce, as much as possi-
ble, the persistence of the virus in the infected ones.
Prevention and early detection play a key role in the 
control strategy for ASF and enhancing early detection 
would also improve the efficacy of the disease control 
measures. In the EU, the provisions to apply in case of 
infection are mainly targeted towards domestic pigs and 
are based on surveillance, epidemiological investiga-
tions, tracing of pigs and stamping out infected holdings 
[7]. However, in order to mitigate the risk of spread, such 
measures are to be applied in combination with strict 
preventive measures in domestic pig holdings. The basic 
elements of biosecurity derive from the knowledge of the 
epidemiology of the disease, the duration of pathogen 
excretion in infected animals, the main routes of excre-
tion, survival of the pathogen in the environment and its 
routes of infection. Some basic principles of biosecurity 
apply to all farming systems and all diseases [8]. However, 
in order to better address preventive and control meas-
ures, the main practical biosecurity measures need to be 
tailored to the targeted disease and to the farming sys-
tems in which they are to be implemented [8]. Indeed, 
biosecurity measures are normally quite standardized 
in commercial holdings, whilst they are not well defined 
and of easy implementation in the backyard sector.
The aim of this paper is to define the main preventive 
measures to adopt to minimize the risk of ASF spread 
in the pig sector, including both industrial and back-
yard production systems. Indeed, backyard holdings 
with poor biosecurity in place are currently playing an 
important role in the maintenance and spread of ASFV 
in the infected eastern neighbouring countries of the EU 
[3]. Moreover, considering the significant involvement of 
wild boar in the current epidemic in the Eastern parts of 
Europe, we also take into account the role played by wild 
boar at the interface with domestic pigs and the measures 
to adopt to properly manage the hunting activities.
Search strategy
This critical review is based on a search in PubMed 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed) using the terms 
African swine fever, ASF, domestic pigs, wild boar, wild-
life, epidemiology, prevention and bio-security. Only 
articles in English were included in the text. EFSA Sci-
entific Review and Opinions on ASF were used as source 
of additional information. Our experiences on ASF 
management and on the biological aspects of the disease 
were used to critically evaluate the articles and to identify 
the main preventive measures to be adopted against ASF. 
The EU legislation and OIE standards on ASF were con-
sulted to ensure coherence with the proposed measures.
Review
African swine fever epidemiology
A range of wild and domestic pig species are susceptible 
to ASFV and different tick vector species, all belonging to 
Ornithodoros genus, can be involved in the epidemiology 
of the disease. Transmission and maintenance of ASF can 
occur in a sylvatic cycle and/or in a domestic pig cycle. 
Depending on the presence or absence of wild Suidae 
and arthropod vectors and on the type of pig production 
system, the epidemiology of the disease varies substan-
tially between different habitats and regions. The African 
scenario includes the presence of ASFV-infected ticks, 
different species of wild suids acting as reservoirs for the 
disease, domestic pigs that have been exposed to ASFV 
for many years and partly ASF-resistant [9, 10]. These 
conditions do not exist in any European Country.
For the purpose of this review, we refer mainly to the 
epidemiological situation in Europe and to the domestic 
pig cycle. In Europe there are currently two main clusters 
of ASFV infection. One of them is in Sardinia where the 
disease was introduced in 1978, most probably from Ibe-
rian Peninsula [11], and it is caused by strains of ASFV 
belonging to genotype I [6]. The second is occurring in 
the eastern part of Europe and it is caused by strains of 
ASFV belonging to genotype II that has 100% sequence 
homology with the ASFV identified in Belarus in June 
2013, a genetic variant of the virus introduced in Geor-
gia in 2007 [5]. The latter is a highly virulent strain induc-
ing an acute form of ASF that results in a mortality rate 
of 94.5–100% in both wild boar and domestic pigs [4, 
12–15].
ASFV has a remarkable ability to survive for long peri-
ods in a protein rich environment and it remains stable 
at pH 4–10 [16]. The virus is not affected by meat matu-
ration processes and meat from pigs slaughtered in the 
infective stages of ASF or that die spontaneously of the 
disease provides a good source of virus. ASFV persist in 
tissues for up to 6 months and can be infectious in sus-
ceptible animals fed with such meat [17]. The virus can 
also remain viable in the lymph nodes of the few survi-
vors to the disease [18, 19] and, in such instance, the nat-
ural death of these animals can re-initiate a new epidemic 
cycle of ASF, if carcasses are not properly disposed and 
the virus gets in contact with a susceptible animal.
The virus is quite resistant to high temperatures and 
it requires exposure to a temperature of 60  °C for at 
least 20 min for inactivation [1]. Fresh and frozen pork, 
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as well as smoked, salted and dried pork may contain 
infective quantities of ASFV [20, 21] whereas the virus 
is inactivated in heat-treated products [1]. Commercial 
processed products (such as ham or cured pork loin) 
contain no active virus 140  days after processing of the 
fresh meat started. ASFV is also able to survive for long 
periods in some tissues such as bone marrow, in spite of 
putrefaction [10]. This probably plays a role in infecting 
scavenging pigs in areas where the disease is endemic. 
The resistance of the virus to inactivation also means that 
transmission is possible via fomites such as contaminated 
clothing and shoes, equipment and vehicles.
Pigs are infected mainly through the oro-nasal route 
after contact with infected pigs or after feeding on virus-
containing pork or contaminated products. All excretions 
and secretions of infected pigs such as blood, faeces, 
urine or saliva can contain virus, and ASFV may remain 
viable in blood and tissues for long periods [3, 5, 17, 19]. 
The onset of viremia is observed from 3 to 5  days post 
infection (DPI) and transmission via direct contact can 
occur for several weeks [22]. As regards ASFV genotype 
II, in pigs experimentally infected, it has been observed 
that the excretion of the virus started during the incuba-
tion period and lasted for the entire period of the disease. 
Hence, pigs were infectious from 4 to 10 DPI [23].
So far, with the strain circulating in the Baltic countries 
and in Poland there is no evidence that recovered pigs 
can become long-term carriers of the ASFV [2–4]. How-
ever, in large pig populations, ASF can be maintained for 
long periods in the area due to constant supply of suscep-
tible pigs [10], illegal movements of infected pork meat, 
poor biosecurity in pig holdings, and aggregation of wild 
boar promoted by feeding [3].
The dynamic of the infection in the wild boar shows 
the same pattern observed in domestic pigs [24]. The role 
played by wild boar in the epidemiology of ASF is mainly 
determined by wild boar abundance and the geographical 
continuity of suitable habitats [25]. Indeed, it appears that 
in Sardinia wild boar have a limited role in the spread of 
the disease [26] whilst in the Baltic countries and Poland 
they are acting as reservoir [3, 4, 25].
Soft ticks of Ornithodoros species, in certain epidemi-
ological contexts, can play a role in transmitting ASFV 
[19]. In Europe, only ticks of the O. erraticus complex 
have been reported in some countries around the Medi-
terranean Basin [27]. Ticks of the genus Ornithodoros 
are common in pig pens in many areas of Africa and in 
certain parts of the Iberian Peninsula, while the infor-
mation available suggests that they are absent from Sar-
dinia [28]. Knowledge on the occurrence of these ticks 
in other areas of Europe is rather incomplete. However, 
in the Baltic countries, in Poland and in Central Europe 
their presence seems unlikely, as their involvement in 
the epidemiological cycle of the disease [29]. Such ticks 
are able to retain ASFV for a long time, at least 5 years, 
and to transmit it to susceptible species [30, 31]. In addi-
tion, some of these ticks can transmit the virus from tick 
to tick through trans-stadial and trans-ovarian trans-
mission [31]. Ornithodoros ticks mainly feed on animal 
species living in burrows or they are harboured inside 
pigsties in old buildings, where they hide in cracks and 
surfaces that provide sufficient humidity. Pigs are mostly 
accidental hosts, from which the ticks can be infected. 
Wild boar has never been found infested by Ornithodoros 
ticks, since wild boar normally rest on the surface, rarely 
on the same spot and never inside burrows. Therefore, 
such ticks can play an important role in maintaining local 
foci of infection, but not in the geographical spread of the 
virus [27].
ASF risk factors, pathways of transmission and preventive 
measures
Risk factors for the spreading of ASFV
Few analytical studies have been carried out to iden-
tify risk factors for ASF at farm level. Factors found to 
increase the risk of outbreak, include free range pig man-
agement system [11], the previous occurrence of a dis-
ease in the farm [32], the presence of an infected pig farm 
in the neighbourhood or of an abattoir in the community, 
and visits by veterinarians and para-veterinarians [33]. A 
spatial regression analysis found density of the road net-
work, of water bodies and of the domestic swine popula-
tion to be associated with outbreaks in Russia [34] and 
a spatial spread model found the movement of infected 
animals to be the most important factor in the spread of 
ASFV [35]. In the backyard sector the main risk factors 
are human induced, such as illegal movements of infected 
pork meat and swill feeding together with suspected 
cases underreporting and “emergency sales” [36]. The 
backyard sector commonly uses swill as supplementary 
feed, which may include untreated ASFV contaminated 
pork or pig products. Often, the contaminated meat may 
have been stored chilled, frozen or after treatment and 
kept over long periods, thus acting as the main mecha-
nism for ASFV maintenance and re-introduction. Recent 
epidemiological investigations carried out in Lithuania 
and Latvia have suggested that fresh grass and seeds con-
taminated by secretions from infectious wild boar could 
be possible source of infection for backyards [2]. Virus re-
introduction and amplification mainly takes place in the 
backyard pigs and then ASFV seasonally spills over first 
to small farms and then to commercial pig farms. Addi-
tionally, the interaction between wild boar and domestic 
pigs can prolong ASFV circulation in both swine popula-
tions, as observed in many outbreaks in Sardinia and in 
the Russian Federation [26, 37]. In Sardinia, the number 
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of backyards together with the illegal free ranging of pigs 
is considered a main risk practice for the persistence of 
ASF in certain areas of the island [6]. Indeed, free-range 
pigs grazing on vast municipal owned lands have been 
strongly associated with the maintenance of ASFV infec-
tion in the endemic area of Nuoro, as demonstrated by 
the intense viral circulation amongst such pigs [11]. In a 
recent study carried out in Sardinia, also the number of 
closed farms, roads density and the mean altitude have 
been associated with an increased risk of ASFV introduc-
tion in pig holdings [38].
In the Baltic countries and in Poland, it was observed 
that wild boar habitat suitability, neighbouring distance 
from infected wild boar and domestic pigs were the 
main risk factors for the introduction into EU free areas 
through infected wild boar [39]. Different studies high-
lighted the continuity of the geographical distribution of 
wild boar, wild boar management (hunting system, win-
ter feeding), local density and size of the infected popula-
tion, direct contact with dead infected wild boar, as the 
most relevant risks for the spread and the persistence of 
the virus in wild boar populations [4, 25, 40].
ASF pathways of transmission and preventive measures
Preventive measures to apply to mitigate the risk of 
spread of a disease in the pig production system are to 
be targeted to the main potential routes of transmission 
of the pathogen. Some of them are applicable across all 
production systems, others are not [8].
Based on the epidemiological characteristics of ASF, 
the disease pathways of transmission [19] are:
  • Direct pig-to-pig contact.
  • Consumption of contaminated feed (swill feeding).
  • Vehicles and other fomites, clothing, footwear, surgi-
cal equipment.
  • Workers and visitors.
  • Slurry.
  • Genetic materials.
  • Bites from ticks.
Direct pig‑to‑pig contact African swine fever virus is 
primarily transmitted by direct contact between infected 
and susceptible pigs. The spread of the virus from infected 
animals can start from the second DPI by means of saliva, 
ocular secretions and nasal discharges [17]. After a few 
days, the virus is shed via urine, faeces and semen. Aerosol 
can also transmit the virus over short distance [17, 22]. It 
is worth to be taken into consideration that infected pigs 
are most contagious during the incubation period of the 
disease, when they may shed virus for up to 48 h before 
showing clinical signs and during the clinical stage of dis-
ease, when a large amounts of virus is present in blood, 
secretions and excretions [23]. Given the characteristics 
of resistance of the virus, this pathway of transmission is 
extremely efficient both, locally (at farm level, village, and 
pasture) and long distance [4]. Therefore, in risk areas it is 
necessary to adopt specific measures to minimize the risk 
of introducing the disease into the herd by direct contact 
between infected and susceptible animals.
•  Physical isolation of the herd
It is aimed at limiting the potential opportunities for 
a susceptible animal to get physically in contact with an 
infected one. Indeed, if a pathogen does not enter the 
holding no infection can take place. Depending on the 
pig production system, the local geographic and socio-
economic conditions and the capacity to invest resources, 
isolation of the holding can be obtained by maintaining 
adequate distances between farms, by full fencing the 
herd and installing a closed entrance to the farm area [8]. 
There are simple measures such as permanent housing 
of pigs and closed entrance to the premise that achieve 
the same objective and can be implemented also in rural 
villages with very limited resources. For the holdings of 
new settlement, physical location of the premise should 
be carefully planned in the light of maintaining adequate 
distances from neighbouring farms, slaughterhouses, 
meat-processing establishments, animal markets and fre-
quently used roads [8].
•  Introduction of new pigs into the herd
No pigs should enter or leave the holding unless nec-
essary and when necessary, adequate preventive meas-
ures shall be adopted to mitigate the risk. Pigs shall be 
introduced into the herd only from trusted and certified 
sources. To mitigate the risk of spread of pathogens, spe-
cial attention shall be given to the management of animal 
transport and to the cleansing and disinfection proce-
dures of the vehicles and the loading/unloading area. 
The number of suppliers for replacement stock should be 
limited and their health status carefully evaluated before 
purchase. Newly purchased pigs shall be maintained for a 
minimum of 30 days in quarantine or, at least, physically 
isolated from the rest of the herd. Frequency of intro-
duction shall be limited too [8]. During the quarantine 
period the animals should be carefully checked to early 
detect the presence of conditions to avoid the introduc-
tion of diseased animals onto the herd. Clinical surveil-
lance, is the most effective tool for early detection of 
ASF [4]. However, given the clinical similarity with other 
diseases of pigs, clinical surveillance should be supple-
mented, as appropriate, by serological and virological 
surveillance [41].
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•  Movement stand still
When pigs are for breeding and production and 
they are destined for another holding, pigs must have 
remained in the holding of origin for a period of 30 days 
prior to loading or since birth if less than 30 days old [42].
•  Pig markets
In certain areas, live pig markets are extremely impor-
tant for local trade. They are obvious mixing points and 
a potential source of disease. Pigs are brought to the 
market by owners or traders and they are a cross point 
where small and commercial producers, traders and 
butchers meet. Therefore, they are a crucial point for the 
spread of diseases. Once pigs are brought to the market, 
they comingle with other animals and they do not have 
any more the health status of the original herd. There-
fore, to limit the risk of spread, pigs that have not been 
sold at market shall not be reintroduced into the origi-
nal herd, unless they do not pass through an appropri-
ate period of quarantine [8]. Pig markets should be kept 
under strict veterinary supervision and the animals are 
to be admitted to the market only if accompanied by a 
certificate attesting the favourable health status. How-
ever, in case ASF is confirmed in the area, live pig mar-
kets should be closed.
•  Disposal of carcasses
Vehicles collecting dead animals represent a major risk 
for the transmission of the disease. They shall not enter 
into the farm and pig carcasses are to be collected out-
side the fence. Drivers have to strictly follow farm bios-
ecurity protocols and they should not enter the holding. 
Carcasses of domestic pigs and wild boar found dead 
in the infected areas shall be processed under official 
supervision and they should be checked and tested to 
early detect the presence of ASFV. Carcasses, discarded 
parts from slaughtered pigs shall be disposed by incin-
eration or burial in an authorized land fill. No part of any 
wild boar, whether shot or found dead, shall be brought 
into a pig holding.
•  Natural mating
Natural mating provided by an external boar would 
also imply moving the boar or the sow for mating 
from one location to another. Such movements of pigs 
between herds are to be regarded as a dangerous prac-
tice. Therefore, in areas at risk such practice should not 
be conducted [8].
Consumption of contaminated feed (swill feeding) Feed-
ing of catering waste is a high risk practice as several 
diseases, including ASF, can be introduced in a healthy 
population through such feeding. It is documented that 
the majority of the outbreaks occurred in ASFV-free 
zones were the result of feeding food waste products from 
infected pigs to susceptible animals [16, 19]. This risk is 
mitigated by observing the ban on feeding swill to pigs as 
foreseen by the EU legislation [43]. A proper implementa-
tion of the existing rules should be ensured and a commu-
nication campaign should be addressed to pig owners to 
make them understand the danger of that practice. In the 
absence of specific legislation and in areas in which swill 
feeding is practiced, treatment of swill at temperatures 
higher than 70 °C should be guaranteed [16, 19].
Vehicles and  other fomites, clothing, footwear, surgical 
equipment African swine fever virus has a remarkable 
ability to survive in the environment for several days, 
especially if protected by organic material. The resistance 
of the virus to inactivation means that transmission is 
possible via contaminated clothing and shoes, equipment 
and vehicles.
Drivers and their vehicles transporting pigs to pig 
holdings, market or slaughterhouse, delivering feed, or 
collecting carcasses represent a major risk for the trans-
mission of the disease. Vehicles used for transport of pigs 
shall be cleaned and disinfected immediately after every 
transport of animals, and if necessary before any new 
loading of animals using disinfectants officially author-
ized in cleaning and disinfection facilities approved by 
the competent authority, and provide documentary evi-
dence that these operations have been performed. In 
cleaning and disinfecting the vehicles, special attention 
should be given to the truck body, the loading ramp, the 
equipment having been in contact with pigs, the driv-
er’s cabin and the protective clothes/boots used during 
unloading. Vehicles used for transport of animals shall 
keep a register containing place and date of disinfection 
[42]. Drivers should strictly follow farm biosecurity pro-
tocols when handling animals and, as a rule, they should 
not enter into pig holdings, at least the area where the 
animals are kept. Pig keepers should take precautions 
against contamination from vehicles by establishing a pig 
loading area and by not allowing drivers into pig area [8].
Sharing of equipment between holdings should be 
avoided. All instruments, equipment or tools that are 
likely to be in contact with pigs, also the ones to restrain 
animals, shall be assigned to the farm and kept clean. In 
case they have to be transported to other farms they have 
to be cleaned and disinfected, also when re-introduced 
into the farm [8].
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Workers and  visitors Visitors should be discouraged 
to enter pig holdings, both commercial and backyard. 
The role of people in transmitting pathogens is well 
documented. Appropriate hygiene measures have to be 
adopted by all persons entering into contact with pigs 
(domestic and/or feral). They can carry pathogens on 
clothing, footwear and hands. People entering the farm, 
including farmers and workers should not have been in 
contact with other pigs recently. In case they have, they 
should not be admitted to the farm.
Visitors, including farm workers, should be provided 
with specific clothes and footwear to be used and left 
into the farm. Workers, working with the herd should not 
have contact with other pigs and they shall not have pigs 
at their home. Pig workers must be well informed of their 
potential role in the spread of the disease.
On small farms, farmers shall avoid visiting other farms 
and also avoid allowing people to enter the premise. 
Farmers should have clothes and footwear to be worn 
and used when entering the pig stable [8].
Slurry Faeces from ASFV infected pigs contains large 
amount of virus [44]. Therefore, disposal of manure, bed-
ding material and slurry have to be considered in areas at 
risk. Indeed, the dispersion of pig slurry on agricultural 
lands is a dangerous practice, the virus can be introduced 
into the environment infecting wild boar and free ranging 
pigs. The survival of ASFV in the environment depends 
also on the season, cold temperature facilitates the sur-
vival of the virus whereas sunlight and drying reduce its 
survival. Commercial pig holdings are normally provided 
with storage basins, which allow manure treatment with 
specific disinfectants [8, 16, 45].
Genetic materials There is not reliable evidence for 
ASFV transmission from sows to foetuses during preg-
nancy [46] as well as for sexual transmission in pigs. How-
ever, ASFV is shed in genital secretions and the virus was 
found in the semen of one boar experimentally infected 
[47]. Due to that, to ensure that semen is free from ASFV 
provisions and requirements are reported in the EU legis-
lation [48] and by the OIE [49].
Bites from  ticks Ornithodoros spp. ticks have been 
found infesting pig pens in Africa and Iberian Peninsula. 
As described previously, such ticks can maintain ASFV 
infection for several months or even years after feed-
ing on viraemic animals and, at local level, they can be 
involved in the maintenance and long-term transmission 
of ASFV. In Madagascar, ASFV was isolated from ticks 
found on a farm where no pigs had been introduced for 
at least 4 years [50]. In Portugal an outbreak was deter-
mined by the presence of ticks that harboured the virus 
for more than 5 years [30]. Due to the ticks long life and 
ability to survive for a long time without feeding, eradica-
tion of ticks from the old pigsties is invariably unsuccess-
ful. Therefore, in order to avoid contacts, pigs shall not be 
housed in infested premises. The premises should be iso-
lated with fences to prevent the access of pigs or destroyed 
and then new premises rebuilt in another location.
In commercial pig holdings, the above-mentioned pre-
ventive measures can be adopted with different degrees 
of implementation. The level of implementation varies 
according to the size and profile of the holding, the exist-
ent infrastructure, the epidemiological situation and the 
capacity of the producer to invest resources [8].
In situation of risk, the farms bio-security plans have 
to be verified by veterinary services and because of the 
virus’s ability to survive in the environment, the plans 
shall also include detailed procedures on cleaning and 
disinfection, which are an essential part of the farm bios-
ecurity system. Lipidic solvents, which destroy the enve-
lope of the virus and commercial disinfectants based on 
iodine and phenolic compounds, are effective in inacti-
vating the ASFV [16, 19]. However, disinfectants should 
be officially authorized by the veterinary service and the 
conditions for their use strictly respected.
The situation is rather different for backyard holdings 
and for free-range pigs where, normally, the investment 
in infrastructures is minimal and few arrangements are 
made to provide the pigs with housing.
Preventive measures in backyard holdings
Backyard holdings with poor bio-security in place are 
currently playing an important role in the spread of ASFV 
in the Eastern part of Europe. Indeed, in this sector of the 
pig production system feeding pigs with kitchen waste is 
common practice and the main biosecurity measures are 
not easy to implement, due to the minimal investment in 
infrastructure typical for this type of pig production sys-
tem. However, there is a set of basic preventive measures 
applicable also in backyard holdings and if they are prop-
erly and strictly implemented they are effective in mini-
mizing the risk of ASFV spread. Such measures include:
  • No swill feeding.
  • Avoid feeding pigs with fresh fodder harvested in 
areas at risk for ASFV exposure.
  • Buying pigs from trusted and certified sources 
(ASFV-free commercial holdings).
  • Keeping pigs confined in stables.
  • Restricting the access to pig‘s stable only to people in 
charge of taking care of the animals.
  • People working in contact with pigs should wear clothes 
and footwear to be worn and used only when working 
in the stable and to be left in the stable after use.
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  • Workers cannot bring food onto the premise.
  • People working in contact with pigs should wash 
hands with soap before entering and leaving the 
premise.
  • Using effective disinfectants to be placed at the 
entrance of the stable.
  • Proper disposal of dead animals or parts of dead ani-
mals to avoid the spread of infected material and also 
to attract wild animals.
  • No wild boar or part of it, shall be brought onto the 
premise.
  • In areas at risk for the presence of ASFV in wild boar, 
where the viral contamination of the environment 
can be high, effective disinfectants, such as calcium 
hydrate (slaked lime), should be spread and renewed, 
around pig‘s stable and at the entrance [51].
  • Pig’s owner and people in charge of pigs shall avoid 
visiting other farms.
Furthermore, to enhance ASFV early detection:
  • Veterinary services should be informed in case of 
dead or sick pigs.
  • Home slaughtering should be carried out under vet-
erinary supervision.
Preventive measures in outdoor keeping practice 
and free‑range pigs
Biosecurity in the free ranging system is almost impos-
sible to apply, especially in endemic areas where common 
pasture is practiced (i.e. municipal pastures in Sardinia 
or in public forests as in Georgia/Armenia). Free rang-
ing pigs is considered a dangerous practice for the per-
sistence of ASFV in certain areas of endemicity. Indeed, 
animals belonging to different herds can share the same 
grazing areas, they can also comingle with wild boar 
facilitating the transmission of the virus [6]. In such cir-
cumstances, free ranging pigs should be forbidden.
In areas at risk, biosecurity in outdoor keeping system 
shall be focused on segregation and feed control. Fencing 
or double fencing is very difficult to implement, and also 
to maintain, but it is the only possible mean to try to mit-
igate the risk of pigs direct contact with infected animals 
and contaminated pasture.
Preventive measures during hunting
Hunting is allowed in the majority of the forested areas 
of North-East Europe and wild boar are one of the more 
intensively hunted ungulate species in Europe. Yet, wild 
boar has expanded throughout Europe during the last 
40 years [52]. Indeed, they have a high reproductive rate, 
and populations can double in size after each reproduc-
tion season [53]. Wild boar are susceptible to ASFV and 
they show similar clinical signs and mortality to domes-
tic pigs [12, 13] with similar virus elimination timing 
and concentration [24]. When wild boar die, infected 
carcasses, if not promptly removed, remain in the envi-
ronment and they can, directly or indirectly, infect other 
susceptible pigs, continuing the epidemiological cycle of 
the disease. Wild boar can also contribute to spread the 
virus during the infectious period of the disease, since 
they eliminate the virus into the environment through-
out their excretions and secretions [12, 24]. In 2015, in 
Poland and in the Baltic countries, 897 wild boar positive 
for ASFV have been hunted or found dead in the affected 
territories (data available at: http://www.efsa.europa.eu/
it/events/event/151123). Most probably the reported fig-
ure is strongly underestimated, since it appears that only 
10% of the positive dead wild boars are detected in the 
forest [4]. Considering that a large amount of ASFV is 
shed during the infectious period of the disease and that 
the virus is rather resistant in the environment, especially 
if protected by organic material, it can be expected that 
in the affected forests, the viral contamination of the 
environment to be rather high. Indeed, hunting wild boar 
implies blood contamination of the soil, transportation of 
dead animals to the dressing facility (when dressing is not 
performed directly on the field), dressing animals, offal 
discharge, meat dissection and its conservation. There-
fore, in the light of a control strategy, the role of the wild 
boar and hunting cannot be underestimated and basic 
preventive measures are to be adopted to minimize the 
risk of spread of the disease.
Minimum biosecurity requirements to apply during 
hunting in the affected territories:
  • Hunters shall be authorised to hunt in the area only 
after a specific training on basic hygiene and biosecu-
rity practices;
  • Hunted wild boar should never leave the hunting 
area unless checked and tested and the carcasses 
released only when resulted negative to ASFV.
  • Transport of hunted animals to the dressing facility 
is carried out using dedicated vehicles. Private cars 
shall be parked outside the hunting house, possibly 
on the main road.
  • The use of the dressing facilities should be authorised 
only in case it is available: tap water, electricity, waste 
water collection and freezers.
  • Animal dressing should be performed using appro-
priate aprons which must remain in the facility. 
Working tools cannot be transported to other places.
  • Hunting suits, including boots/shoes should be kept 
in specific bags. Boots are worn in the dressing room 
before hunting and re-placed in the same bag after 
hunting.
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  • Boots and apron shall be cleaned and disinfected 
after each use.
  • Dressing rooms are to be equipped with effective dis-
infectants.
  • Offals should be stored in proper containers inside 
the dressing areas and before storing, containers shall 
be cleaned and sprayed with effective disinfectants.
  • Ground pits for offal disposal should be at least 1.5 m 
deep, fenced and closed with a locked closure. Pits 
should be located in close proximity to the dressing 
room.
  • Wild boar carcasses shall be individually identified 
before storing. In case of ASFV positive outcome 
all stored carcasses have to be disposed under vet-
erinary supervision and the whole dressing room 
cleaned and disinfected.
Conclusions
The current ASF situation in the East part of the EU is 
representing a constant threat to the EU livestock sec-
tor and the recent expansion of the disease has also dem-
onstrated the ability of the virus to spread long distance. 
ASF is a disease for which there is no effective vaccine 
and its control relies on early detection followed by rapid 
eradication. Considering the epidemiological situation 
and the possible economic consequences of the intro-
duction of ASF, it is extremely important that free terri-
tories are maintained free by preventing the introduction 
of the disease. For such purpose, bio security plays a key 
role in preventing ASF, and given its epidemiological 
cycle, simple measures may prove effective in mitigat-
ing the transmission pathways of the disease, also in the 
backyard sector. In certain countries, in case of occur-
rence of epidemic diseases, there is the attempt to try to 
decrease the local risk of further spread, by reducing the 
number of backyards, especially in the areas surround-
ing commercial holdings, and afterwards prohibiting 
this type of farming practice. Given the socio-economic 
relevance of the backyard sector, such discriminatory 
approach needs to be carefully evaluated since it might 
lead to poor compliance of the measures enforced to 
control the disease.
The final responsibility of controlling ASF belongs to 
the veterinary authorities. However, in risk areas, pig 
producers have to understand the risk posed by the pres-
ence of the disease and they have to adopt all the neces-
sary precautionary measures to protect their own herds. 
To achieve this, veterinary services shall provide basic 
information to pig holders through appropriate com-
munication campaigns and by promoting the adoption 
of preventive measures. The key for changing behav-
iours and practices lies in people’s perception of the level 
of risk and in such situation, it is of crucial importance 
that all the elements of the pig production and marketing 
chain, including backyards, transporters, service provid-
ers and slaughterhouses, are involved in the implementa-
tion of the control strategy for the disease.
In adopting an eradication strategy against ASF, the 
role of wild boar cannot be underestimated and preven-
tive measures need to be established also to control the 
possible pathways of ASFV transmission from wild to 
domestic pigs. Hunters may have an active role in pre-
venting the spread of ASFV and they should be involved 
in the disease control strategy since the beginning.
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